Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness
--------------------------------------
The major reason given in the philosophical literature for
dissatisfaction with theories of vagueness based on fuzzy
logic is that such theories give rise to a problem of
higher-order vagueness or artificial precision. In this
paper I first outline the problem and survey suggested
solutions: fuzzy epistemicism; measuring truth on an ordinal
scale; logic as modelling; fuzzy metalanguages; blurry sets;
and fuzzy plurivaluationism. I then argue that in order to
decide upon a solution, we need to understand the true
nature and source of the problem. Two possible sources are
discussed: the problem stems from the very nature of
vagueness---from the defining features of vague predicates;
or the problem stems from the way in which the meanings of
predicates are determined---by the usage of speakers
together with facts about their environment and so on. I
argue that the latter is the true source of the problem, and
on this basis that fuzzy plurivaluationism is the correct
solution.