Problems of Precision in Fuzzy Theories of Vagueness and
Bayesian Epistemology
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A common objection to theories of vagueness based on fuzzy
logics centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical
degree of truth -- a real number between 0 and 1 -- to each
vague statement is excessively precise. A common objection
to Bayesian epistemology centres on the idea that assigning
a single numerical degree of belief -- a real number between
0 and 1 -- to each proposition is excessively precise. In
this paper I explore possible parallels between these
objections. In particular I argue that the only good
objection along these lines to fuzzy theories of vagueness
does not translate into a good objection to Bayesian
epistemology. An important part of my argument consists in
drawing a distinction between two different notions of
degree of belief, which I call dispositional degree of
belief and epistemic degree of belief.