

Contents

Introduction	I
Part I. Foundations	
1. Beginnings	15
1.1 Toolkit	17
1.2 The Classical Semantic Picture	24
2. The Space of Possible Theories of Vagueness	33
2.1 Epistemicism (Deny Nothing)	34
2.2 Additional Truth Values (Deny 1a)	50
2.3 Truth Gaps (Deny 1b)	71
2.4 Supervaluationism (Deny 1c)	76
2.5 Plurivaluationism (Deny 2)	98
2.6 Contextualism	113
2.7 Intuitionism (Assert Nothing)	122
Part II. Vagueness	
3. What is Vagueness?	127
3.1 What Should We Want from a Definition of Vagueness?	127
3.2 Existing Definitions of Vagueness	133
3.3 Closeness	140
3.4 Vagueness as Closeness	145
3.5 The Advantages of Closeness	159
4. Accommodating Vagueness	175
4.1 Epistemicism	175
4.2 Additional Truth Values and Truth Gaps	186

4.3	Supervaluationism	191
4.4	Plurivaluationism	197
4.5	Contextualism	200
Part III. Degrees of Truth		
5.	Who's Afraid of Degrees of Truth?	209
5.1	On the Very Idea of Degrees of Truth	210
5.2	Classical Logic	220
5.3	A Gated Community in Theory Space?	224
5.4	Truth and Assertibility	248
5.5	Truth-Functionality	251
5.6	Denying Bivalence	274
5.7	Different Senses of 'Fuzzy Logic'	275
6.	Worldly Vagueness and Semantic Indeterminacy	277
6.1	Artificial Precision	277
6.2	Sharp Boundaries	304
	Conclusion	317
	<i>References</i>	321
	<i>Index</i>	333